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When people share risk in ﬁnancial markets, intermediaries provide costly enforce-
ment for most trades and, hence, are an integral part of ﬁnancial markets’ organi-
zation. We assess the degree of risk sharing that can be achieved through ﬁnancial
markets when enforcement is based on the threat of exclusion from future trading
as well as on costly enforcement intermediaries. Starting from constrained eﬃcient
allocations and taking into account the public good character of enforcement we
study a Lindahl-equilibrium where people invest in asset portfolios and simultane-
ously choose to relax their borrowing limits by paying fees to an intermediary who
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1ﬁnances the costs of enforcement. We show that ﬁnancial markets always allow
for optimal risk sharing as long as markets are complete, default is prevented in
equilibrium and intermediaries provide costly enforcement competitively. In equi-
librium, costly enforcement translates into both agent-speciﬁc borrowing limits and
price schedules that include a separate default premium. Enforcement costs - or,
equivalently, default premia - increase borrowing costs, while interest rates per se
depend on the change in enforcement over time.
Keywords: Limited Commitment, Enforcement Intermediaries, Lindahl-equilibrium, Endoge-
nous Borrowing Constraints
JEL Classiﬁcations: C73, D60, G10, H41, K42
21 Introduction
In modern economies people share risk mainly through trades in ﬁnancial assets. Most
of these trades involve ex-post transfers between the parties involved and have to be
enforced since a party obliged to make a transfer has necessarily an incentive to de-
fault. To enforce trades many institutions have been set up that assess the problem of
default, specify penalties for default and carry out these penalties. One example is a
bankruptcy procedure with its speciﬁc set of rules, its application through a court system
and its enforcement by public authorities. Other examples are enforcement and ﬁnancial
intermediaries such as rating and collection agencies, clearinghouses or settlement banks.
Since these intermediaries provide costly enforcement for most transactions on ﬁnancial
markets, they form an integral part of ﬁnancial markets’ organization. The goal of this
paper is ﬁrst to assess the degree of risk sharing that can be achieved through ﬁnancial
markets when intermediaries provide costly enforcement of trades. We then investigate
how default is prevented in equilibrium when intermediaries provide enforcement and
agents bear the costs associated with enforcement when making their ﬁnancial decisions.
The basic set-up for our analysis is a standard dynamic risk sharing problem where
commitment to contracts is limited.1 In our framework however, when enforcing risk
sharing people can rely not only on the threat of exclusion from future risk sharing,
but also on a punishment technology. While resources are required to operate this
technology, it allows for enforcement by inﬂicting a utility penalty on a person that
violates the arrangement. Enforcement is thus treated as a decision variable, since the
technology choice forms part of the risk sharing arrangement itself.2
After characterizing optimal risk sharing, we establish versions of the Welfare Theorems
by introducing a perfectly competitive, proﬁt-maximizing intermediary that operates
the punishment technology. Since operating this technology acts as a threat to enforce
1Examples of this literature include Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al.
(2002) among others.
2For a detailed discussion of this approach see Koeppl (2003).
3ﬁnancial trades, enforcing an obligation of someone does not preclude the use of this tech-
nology to enforce obligations of anybody else. Hence, this non-rivalry causes enforcement
through the intermediary to be a public good.3
To capture these characteristics we use the ideas of Lindahl-equilibrium4 when decen-
tralizing optimal allocations. We assume that asset markets are complete and people
are restricted in their trades by borrowing constraints. Following Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) borrowing limits take the form of “endogenous solvency constraints” that rule out
default in equilibrium. Given equilibrium prices people can borrow up to a level of debt
that they are willing to pay back. This amount reﬂects not only that people are excluded
from asset markets forever after defaulting, but also punished through the technology.
Individuals, however, do not only choose how much to invest in state-contingent claims
subject to a given borrowing limit, but in doing so also decide how restricted they are with
respect to their borrowing. In fact, agents can borrow more by “demanding” enforcement
to back up larger transactions. Agents therefore choose a borrowing limit from a full
schedule of limits associated with diﬀerent levels of enforcement for a “price” that reﬂects
enforcement costs. As is typical for a Lindahl-equilibrium, the intermediary supplies
this enforcement competitively by operating the technology on agent-speciﬁc markets
for individualized prices. Hence, each agent demands the use of the technology on an
individualized market facing a price that reﬂects his marginal utility from enforcement
through the technology.
3Green (2000) emphasizes this feature by pointing out that “Certainty of settlement is a public
good in a market where the ability of one trader to meet commitments often depends beneﬁting from
the fulﬁlment of others’ commitments. ... a clearinghouse may set, monitor, and enforce standards
of creditworthiness ... it may require participants to transfer securities and funds to one another in
reliance on its judgement, rather than exercising their independent judgement of the creditworthiness
of counterparties. The clearinghouse may set and compute participants’ margin requirements, hold
participants’ collateral in escrow, ... , manage the liquidation of defaulting participants’ positions, and
so forth.” (Green (2000), p. 23).
4For an extensive review on general equilibrium theory with public goods and the concept of Lindahl-
equilibrium, see Milleron (1972).
4We show that ﬁnancial markets always allow for optimal risk sharing as long as markets
are complete, default is prevented in equilibrium and intermediaries provide enforce-
ment competitively. Furthermore, in equilibrium costly enforcement translates into both
borrowing limits and price schedules that diﬀer across people.
The amount people can borrow is restricted in equilibrium by endogenous solvency con-
straints. As already pointed out these constraints reﬂect the punishment associated with
default: exclusion from future trade on asset markets plus the utility penalty arising from
the punishment technology. Moreover, total costs of borrowing are non-linear and are
composed of a price that is linear and a fee that pays for the costs of enforcing the
trade. This fee is agent-speciﬁc and reﬂects the severity of the default problem. Hence,
we derive a theory of ﬁnancial markets structure where people are not only restricted in
their borrowing, but also borrow at diﬀerent rates that reﬂect the premium required to
be able to obtain additional funds.
There is a rich literature that analyzes constraints on debts5 while other contributions
focus on the importance of various transaction costs for asset prices6. We contribute to
this large literature by linking debt constraints to the problem of incurring additional
costs when enforcing “tighter” constraints. While our ﬁndings show how these costs
feed into asset prices, we also indicate that it is possible to disentangle asset prices
into a default-free part and a default premium that is associated precisely with the
cost of default. Here enforcement costs - or, equivalently, default premia - are increasing
borrowing costs, while the risk-free rate per se tends to be lower. This suggest a potential
new route for analyzing pricing puzzles by decomposing agent-speciﬁc interest rates into
components that reﬂect diﬀerent sources of costs.
Furthermore, we oﬀer a way to incorporate optimal market design into general equilib-
rium theory. Since the intermediaries oﬀer and people demand enforcement as part of
5Examples are Levine and Zame (1996), Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Zhang (1997) among
others.
6See e.g. Luttmer (1996) and He and Modest (1995).
5their optimal behavior, one can see a ﬁrst step towards deriving a theory of how markets
set borrowing limits and price claims that are subject to default.7 Finally, even though
we analyze enforcement and, hence, a particular public good, an additional contribution
of our work here is that we show how to extend the ideas of a Lindahl-equilibrium with
individualized markets for a public good to ﬁnancial markets as well as dynamic environ-
ments with sequential market structures where externalities inﬂuence only the feasible
sets of individual agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the
framework for our analysis and describes optimal risk sharing with costly third-party
enforcement. In Section 3 and 4 we establish diﬀerent versions of the Second Welfare
Theorem incorporating the ideas of enforcement as a public good. Section 5 shows that -
given our assumptions - ﬁnancial markets are generally eﬃcient in providing risk sharing
even if enforcement is costly to provide. Finally, we discuss asset pricing implications in
more detail. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Environment
2.1 Physical Environment
Consider the following environment where time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,....
There is a ﬁnite set of inﬁnitely lived agents I, who receive each period a stochastic
endowment of a single good. Let ω = {ω1,ω2,...} be a sequence of independently and
identically distributed random variables each having ﬁnite support Ω = {1,2,...,S} and
denote the probability of ωt equaling s by πs > 0 for all s ∈ Ω. Deﬁne a t-history of ω
7The literature on consumer bankruptcy has made some progress in this direction (cf. for example
Chatterjee, et al. (2002) or Livshits, et al. (2001)). In this literature ﬁnancial intermediaries when
making loans distinguish between agents according to their likelihood of default. Hence, all transactions
take place on competitive, but segmented loan markets. This literature, however, does not analyze
optimal bankruptcy/enforcement rules and how these rules are implemented on loan markets.
6by ωt = {ω1,ω2,...,ωt} and let Ωt be the set of all possible t-histories of ω with π(ωt)
being the probability of a particular history. The endowment for agent i ∈ I in period t
is determined by the realization of ωt and denoted by yi
t,s when ωt = s for t = 0,1,....
We assume that yi
t,s 6= y
j
t,s for some agents i,j ∈ I and that
P
i∈I yi
t,s = Y > 0 for all
s ∈ Ω and t = 0,1,..., i.e., that there is no aggregate risk and the economy is stationary.
This assumption is purely made to facilitate the exposition.















where β ∈ (0,1) and Et expresses the expectation conditional on a history of shocks
at time t. We assume that ui is increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable. Furthermore, ui is bounded from below with normalization ui(0) = 0 and
limc→0 u0
i(c) = ∞.
Since the agents are risk averse and face idiosyncratic income shocks, there is an incentive
to share income risk. We assume, however, that there is limited enforcement. Each
period, after uncertainty in period t is resolved and the current distribution of endowment
{yi
t,s}i∈I is known, an agent i can choose to remain in autarky forever. The utility of


















aut expresses the future expected utility from autarky which is independent of
the realized history of shocks.
The economy has access to a “punishment” technology that reduces an agent’s current
and future utility in case this agent decides to remain in autarky. Speciﬁcally, if this
technology is operated at a level dt ∈ [0,1] and an agent decides to remain in autarky
7forever in period t, the agent loses a fraction dt of her autarkic utility as given by equation
(2).
Operating this technology in period t at a level dt requires an investment of resources
equal to ψ(dt) in period t which depreciates fully after one period. The level of this
punishment technology in any period t, dt, is set before the current shock ωt is realized.
Therefore, the level of punishment in period t can depend only on the past history of
realizations of ω, i.e., ωt−1. Formally and slightly abusing notation, we denote the ωt−1-
measurable process of punishment levels by d ∈ D = {{dt}∞
t=0|dt : Ωt−1 −→ [0,1]}, where
Ω−1 is deﬁned to contain a single element. To ensure the convexity of the problem we
assume that the cost function ψ(·) is increasing, strictly convex and does not include any
ﬁxed costs:
Assumption 2.1. 1. ψ0 ≥ 0 and ψ00 > 0.
2. ψ(0) = 0 and ψ0(0) = 0.
2.2 Incentive Feasible Allocation
We will now deﬁne incentive feasible allocations for the risk-sharing environment de-
scribed in the previous section.8. An allocation ({ci}i∈I,d) ∈ CI × D is given by a








+ ψ(d(ωt)) ≤ Y for all t,(ωt,s). (3)
An agent can switch to autarky for any given state s at time t. Her decision will depend
on the comparison between the continuation utility oﬀered by an allocation and the value
of autarky given the current level of punishment. Since we are interested in voluntary
8For a more detailed discussion on the set up as well as the concept of incentive feasibility in this
context see Koeppl (2002).
8risk-sharing, we restrict attention to allocations that give every agent an incentive to
participate in risk-sharing over time.





















for all i ∈ I, for all t,s. An allocation is incentive feasible if it is feasible for all t, (ωt,s)
and ex post incentive compatible for all i ∈ I, for all t, (ωt,s).
For the reminder of the paper we denote the set of incentive feasible allocations by
Γ ⊂ CI × D.
2.3 Optimal Allocations
The concept of incentive feasibility allows us to deﬁne optimal allocations. An alloca-
tion ({ci}i∈I,d) ∈ Γ is optimal if there exists no other incentive feasible allocation that
provides all agents with at least as much expected utility at period 0 and at least one
of them with strictly more expected utility at period 0. Denoting the initial level of
expected utility promised to agent i by u0




























i for all i ∈ I \ {1}. (7)
9Denote the Lagrange multiplier on the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint (4)
of agent i in state (ωt−1,s) by ξi(ωt−1,s) and deﬁne ˜ ξi(ωt−1,s) =
ξi(ωt−1,s)
βtπ(ωt−1,s). We have
then the following ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with respect to the optimal choice of





























where νi (with ν1 = 1) is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7) and λ(ωt−1,s) the
multiplier for the resource constraint.
The optimality condition (9) makes it apparent that enforcement through the punishment
technology is a public good. It is the classic condition ﬁrst derived by Samuelson (1954)
for the optimal provision of a public good. Operating the technology at a level d(ωt−1) >
0 beneﬁts not only one agent, but all agents that are constrained. This is due to the
fact that a higher level of d(ωt−1) relaxes the ex post incentive compatibility constraints
(4) for all agents simultaneously. Hence, it is optimal to equate the marginal costs of
using the technology with the sum of marginal beneﬁts that all agents derive from the
technology. Note that equation (9) takes into account that not all agents are necessarily
constrained. If some agent i is unconstrained, her Lagrange multiplier on the ex post
incentive compatibility constraint, ξi(ωt−1,s), is zero indicating that she does not derive
any direct marginal beneﬁt from operating the technology even though there is an indirect
beneﬁt from better risk sharing.
Summarizing main results for the problem (5) - (7) optimal incentive feasible allocations
always exist for the given environment. Furthermore, if the ﬁrst-best allocation is not
incentive feasible, it is always optimal to partially rely on the punishment technology for
enforcement since by Assumption 2.1 the marginal costs of the technology at d(ωt−1) = 0
are small. It also is never optimal to set d(ωt−1) = 1 which justiﬁes the equality sign in
10the ﬁrst-order condition (9). Last, the optimal choice of using the punishment technology
is path-dependent, i.e., varies over time with the sequence of realized endowment shocks.9
To facilitate the exposition we assume without loss of generality for the remainder of this
paper that ui = u for all i ∈ I.
3 Lindahl Equilibria with Enforcement Intermedi-
aries
We are now taking into account that enforcement - or, more speciﬁcally, the punishment
technology - has the character of a public good and analyze whether the optimal level
of the technology as well as optimal risk sharing can be achieved through a ﬁnancial
markets arrangement. In doing so we rely on ideas captured by the concept of Lindahl-
equilibrium where the public good is sold on individualized markets for agent-speciﬁc
prices that reﬂect the marginal utility of an agent from the public good.
The basic set-up is as follows. There are one-period state-contingent claims that pay
in units of the consumption good and are traded competitively. Hence, markets are
complete in the sense that there are as many securities as there are realizations of ωt at
period t; the size of possible trades, however, is restricted through limits on borrowing in
form of “endogenous solvency constraints” as introduced by Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
These solvency constraints ensure that agents do not have an incentive to default - or,
equivalently, prefer a certain outside option such as autarky. Since default is associated
with a speciﬁc level of utility, agents are allowed to borrow only up to an amount that
gives them exactly this level of life-time utility if they honor their debt and repay the
borrowed amount plus interest.
In our environment, people can inﬂuence their utility from default by using the punish-
ment technology. The technology itself is operated by a proﬁt maximizing competitive
9For details on these results see Koeppl (2003).
11ﬁrm that sells the use of the technology to the agents at agent-speciﬁc prices. If an
agent does not demand any enforcement through the punishment technology default is
punished by permanent exclusion from asset markets and her borrowing constraints is
set to reﬂect this punishment. If an agent, however, demands some enforcement through
the technology for a positive price, she reduces her wealth, but is able to relax her bor-
rowing constraints. As we will show later, this set up guarantees the eﬃcient provision
of enforcement and - together with agents choosing their borrowing constraints - allows
for constrained optimal risk sharing.
3.1 Enforcement Intermediaries
The punishment technology is operated by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm which will be
called the enforcement intermediary. In period t − 1, after the endowment shocks have
been realized, the intermediary supplies a level of punishment d for next period and
sells the “right to use” the punishment technology at level d in period t to agent i at
the agent-speciﬁc price pe
i which is quoted in period-t goods. Next period, he collects
the payments in period-t goods from last period’s sales to the agents and operates the
technology at the level he chose last period. Formally, taking agent-speciﬁc prices {pe
i}i∈I














The agent-speciﬁc prices, pe
i, are expressed in units of the consumption good at period
t and are given by an ωt−1-measurable stochastic process taking positive values for all
ωt−1, i.e., pe
i : Ωt−1 −→ I R+. The total fee charged to agent i, pe
id, is to be interpreted
as a direct transfer of resources from agent i to the enforcement intermediary. Since the
12punishment technology is linear with a strictly convex cost function (cf. Assumption
2.1), proﬁts will be strictly positive whenever d > 0. We denote proﬁts in period t given
a history of shocks ωt−1 by Θt(ωt−1). Every period, these proﬁts are then paid out as a
lump-sum transfer to the agents that is constant across agents.
Note that the intermediary decides about the level of punishment before period-t endow-
ment shocks are realized. He receives, however, the fees charged to consumers only after
the period-t shocks have occurred. Hence, we implicitly assume that the intermediary
has one-period commitment, i.e., he will carry out his initial decision once the current
shock has been realized and he has received the payments from the agents. Furthermore,
we rule out any further incentive problem on part of the intermediary by assuming that
he will use the punishment technology in case of default by agents on trades made in the
market for state-contingent claims.









By Assumption 2.1, d = 0 is a solution to equation (11) only if pe
i = 0 for all i. It will
become clear later that zero prices for all agents corresponds to a situation where the
marginal utility of the technology is zero for everybody. This corresponds to a situation
where some ﬁrst-best consumption allocation is in fact incentive feasible.10
3.2 Asset Markets and Borrowing Constraints
The asset market structure in period t after a history of shocks ωt is given by a complete
set of one-period state-contingent claims. Let q(ωt,s) be the price of a claim in period
t after history ωt to one unit of the consumption good conditional on ωt+1 = s. Denote
10We are ignoring here the second corner solution, since it is never optimal to operate the technology
at d = 1.
13by ai(ωt,s) the holdings of such a claim by agent i. The stochastic processes of asset
holdings of agent i and asset prices are then given by ai = {{ai
t}∞
t=1|ai
t : Ωt −→ I R} and
q = {{qt}∞
t=1|qt : Ωt −→ I R+} respectively.
Agents invest in these Arrow-Debreu securities to insure against their endowment risk.
When doing so they face a full schedule of borrowing constraints that is speciﬁc for




t : Ωt−1 −→ [0,1]} be agent i’s demand for the use of the punishment
technology which we call from now on borrowing rights. The schedule of borrowing
constraints that agent i faces given history ωt is then denoted by Bi(di(ωt),(ωt,s)) for all
agents i ∈ I with the stochastic process given by Bi = {{Bi,t}∞
t=0|Bi,t : [0,1]×Ωt −→ I R}.
We assume that the schedule of borrowing constraints is strictly decreasing and convex.
Assumption 3.1. For all i ∈ I, B0
i(di(ωt),(ωt,s)) < 0 and B00
i (di(ωt),(ωt,s)) ≥ 0 for
all (ωt,s).
Denote the wealth of agent i by wi = {{wi
t}∞
t=0|wi
t : Ωt −→ I R}. Given her wealth, the
problem of agent i is then to choose current consumption, a portfolio of state-contingent
claims and borrowing rights such as to maximize her utility taking prices and the schedule












































t,s)) for all s ∈ S. (15)
Note that the agent’s optimal choices depend only on the total wealth w at the start of
a period as deﬁned by (14). The composition of wealth, i.e., payoﬀs of state-contingent
14claims, proﬁts from the intermediary and costs of having bought additional borrowing
rights, does not matter for the agent’s choice.
The interpretation of the borrowing constraints (15) is as follows. When choosing her
trades in state-contingent claims, agent i is restricted by schedules Bi. These schedules
represent the amount the agent can borrow given she demands a level di of borrowing
rights - or, equivalently, enforcement through the technology. Hence, by Assumption 3.1,
she can choose to relax the constraints on her ﬁnancial trades by buying additional bor-
rowing rights at the agent-speciﬁc price pe
i. The demand for these rights, di, corresponds
then to the rights of using the punishment technology to secure the agent’s overall debt
position.
3.3 Lindahl-equilibrium for Sequential Security Markets
Our set up leads us to the following deﬁnition of a Lindahl-equilibrium for sequential
security markets which we will call simply Lindahl-equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A Lindahl-equilibrium for schedules of borrowing constraints {Bi}i∈I















0 = d0 for all i ∈ I, (18)
is given by stochastic processes for security prices and agent-speciﬁc prices (q,{pe
i}i∈I),
a stochastic process of punishment, d, and stochastic processes for asset holdings, con-
sumption and borrowing rights, {ci,di,ai}i∈I, such that
1. {ci,di,ai}i∈I solve problem (12) - (15) taking (q,pe
i,Bi) as given
152. d solves problem (10) taking {pe
i}i∈I as given for all ωt−1, for all t > 1





t,s) = Y − ψ(d(ω











t) for all i,ω
t. (21)
For our purpose it is important to look only at equilibria that prevent agents from
defaulting. We therefore restrict attention to Lindahl-equilibria where the schedules
of borrowing constraints are such that no agent has an incentive to default on any
obligations - arising from ai and pe
idi - for any choice of borrowing rights, but otherwise
allow for best possible risk sharing given a level of borrowing rights. This is formalized
in the deﬁnition below.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A Lindahl-equilibrium (ˆ q,{ˆ pe
i}i∈I, ˆ d,{ˆ ci, ˆ di,ˆ ai}i∈I) has borrowing limits










s) + βVaut] (22)
for all i, (ωt,s).
We emphasize that condition (22) is imposed on the whole schedule of borrowing con-
straints, and not only at the equilibrium level of rights demanded by agent i. Condition
(22) ensures that no agent has an incentive to default at any level of di(ωt). Given her
choice of di(ωt), her future expected utility of borrowing up to the limit Bi(di(ωt),(ωt,s))
is equal to her outside option of remaining in autarky forever and being punished at level
di(ωt). Since Jt is strictly increasing in overall wealth w, whenever the schedule of bor-
rowing constraints for agent i satisﬁes equation (22), agent i has no incentive to default
for any choice of di.
16It is also crucial here that we impose the borrowing constraints on the overall level
of wealth rather than the size of trades in a particular state-contingent claim. This
implies that - for any Lindahl-equilibrium - agents who demanded borrowing rights in
the previous period will pay their fees once their endowment shock has been realized
in the current period. Hence, Deﬁnition 3.3 rules out that agents have an incentive to
default on their obligations with the intermediary for any level of borrowing rights they
can demand. This is important since it ensures that the enforcement intermediary will -
for any choice of d - obtain the payments from all agents to operate the technology. This
justiﬁes that we have not imposed an incentive compatibility constraint on the problem
of the intermediary that would have taken into account that agents could default on the
fees charged by the intermediary.
3.4 Second Welfare Theorem
By Assumption 3.1 the constraint set of each agent is convex and, hence, strict concavity
of the objective function implies that the ﬁrst-order conditions together with an appro-
priately deﬁned transversality condition are suﬃcient for a solution to problem (12) -
(15). Denote the Lagrange-multiplier on the budget constraint (13) by λi(ωt) and the
multipliers on the borrowing constraints (15) by µi(ωt,s). Assuming that Jt+1 is dif-
ferentiable with respect to wi(ωt,s), the ﬁrst-order necessary condition with respect to

















t,s) = 0. (24)
Since the envelope theorem implies that J0











t,s) = 0 (25)
17where µi(ωt,s) = 0 if wi(ωt,s) > Bi(di(ωt),(ωt,s)) and the ﬁrst-order condition with


























The ﬁrst term of equation (26) describes the marginal cost of choosing di associated
with the fees paid in every state. The second term describes the net marginal beneﬁt
from relaxing the borrowing constraint for every state: on the one hand a higher choice
of di relaxes the constraint by reducing Bi and, hence, allows for more consumption
smoothing; on the other hand, it tightens the borrowing constraint for every state as the
agent’s overall wealth is reduced by the fees paid to the intermediary.


































Before establishing a version of the Second Welfare Theorem we derive some properties
of asset prices and personalized prices for borrowing rights. We ﬁrst show that uncon-
strained agents have the highest marginal rate of intertemporal substitution for every
optimal allocation. This marginal rate of substitution is later used to determine the asset
price process for a Lindahl-equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4. Let ({ci}i∈I,d} be an optimal allocation. If for j ∈ I equation (4) holds









18Since asset prices will be determined using Lemma 3.4, the only missing part in de-
centralizing an optimal allocation as a Lindahl-equilibrium with borrowing limits that
are not too tight consists, then, of ﬁnding agent-speciﬁc prices for borrowing rights and
schedules of borrowing constraints that satisfy equation (22) for every agent. The next
result describes the situation where some agent - or subgroup of agents - does not beneﬁt
directly from the punishment technology, i.e., his marginal utility from the public good
is zero.
Lemma 3.5. For any Lindahl-equilibrium, pe
i(ωt) = 0 if µi(ωt,s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma states that the agent-speciﬁc price is strictly positive in equilibrium only if
the agent is borrowing constrained for some state s in the next period. In case a ﬁrst-
best consumption allocation is incentive feasible, this implies that agent-speciﬁc prices
in a Lindahl-equilibrium with borrowing limits that are not too tight are zero for all
agents and, hence, d = 0. This lemma is not in contradiction to the requirement of
Deﬁnition 3.2 that all agents demand the same quantity of the good, i.e., di = d for all
i. Facing a zero price for borrowing rights while unconstrained an agent is indiﬀerent
between any level of d. We then assume that the agent demands the right amount of d
in equilibrium.11
For any agent i that is constrained at least for some state after history ωt, let S0
i be the

















For any Lindahl-equilibrium where borrowing constraints are not too tight we must have
that for any given (ωt,s)









t,s) + βVaut]) (31)
which is well deﬁned since the function J is strictly increasing in wealth. Assuming again
































This is due to the fact that for unconstrained agents the deﬁnition of the asset price
process equates the marginal rate of substitution with the price of the state-contingent
claim. Furthermore, the terms in the sum of the numerator are only non-zero if the
borrowing constraints for a state s is binding. Using equation (32) and the envelope
theorem, for any Lindahl-equilibrium that has borrowing limits which are not too tight












These prices reﬂect that the marginal beneﬁt agent i derives from operating the pun-
ishment technology at d(ωt) which is zero if the agent is not borrowing constrained (cf.
Lemma 3.5). If we substitute this expression together with the optimality condition of
the public good d, equation (9), into the ﬁrst-order condition of the intermediary (11),
20it is apparent that d(ωt) maximizes proﬁts given history ωt and prices pe
i(ωt) for all i.
Finally, we introduce the following condition on the asset price process.12







t|ω0) < ∞ for all ω0. (36)
This leads directly to our main result - decentralizing a given optimal allocation as a
Lindahl-equilibrium with borrowing limits that are not too tight - which is stated below.13
This result is also important in the sense that it shows the existence of Lindahl-equilibria
under very weak restrictions.
Theorem 3.7. Let ({ci}i∈I,d) be an optimal allocation. Suppose the security price pro-
cess deﬁned by equation (33) has high interest rates and agent-speciﬁc prices are given
by equation (35). Then there exist initial conditions ({ai
0}i∈I,{pe
i,0}i∈I,d0), asset hold-
ings and schedules of borrowing constraints, ({ai}i∈I,{Bi}i∈I), such that the security
price process deﬁned by equation (33), the agent-speciﬁc prices deﬁned by equation (35),
the schedule of borrowing constraints, the supply of punishment, d, and the demands by
agents, {ci,di,ai}i∈I, where di = d for all i ∈ I, are a Lindahl-equilibrium with borrowing
limits that are not too tight.
Proof. See Appendix.
12In a related context, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show in their Proposition 4.10 that implied interest
rates are high given an optimal allocation that exhibits some risk sharing. Since it can be shown that
some risk sharing is always feasible as long as we have ψ0(0) = 0, we conclude that for our framework,
the condition of high implied interest rates is fulﬁlled for every optimal allocation.
13It is straightforward to also decentralize the initial level d0 at which the punishment technology is
operated. One has to look at the initial problem for an agent of choosing her borrowing constraints at
t = 0 for each ω0 and paying an agent-speciﬁc price pe
i,0 for borrowing rights di
0.
214 Optimality of Lindahl-Equilibria
Having shown that Lindahl-equilibria can implement eﬃcient outcomes, this leaves the
question whether ﬁnancial markets where intermediaries provide costly enforcement al-
ways achieve eﬃcient outcomes. The methodology to address this question is straight-
forward. First, we transform any Lindahl-equilibrium with sequential markets into an
equilibrium of a corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy with participation constraints
that restrict the feasible consumption set along the lines of Kehoe and Levine (1993).
The proof of the First Welfare Theorem is then completely standard and follows as a
corollary.
For this purpose we deﬁne an Arrow-Debreu pricing functional p0 that assigns a price
to any vector in the consumption space. Hence, p0 : C −→ I R+, where C is the set of
all possible consumption plans for a consumer. Whenever p0 is countably additive, the









where Q0(ωt|ω0) is the period 0 price of one unit of the consumption good in state ωt
conditional on the ﬁrst period shock ω0 and Q(ω0|ω0) ≡ 1. For a countably additive













































22Intermediaries solve an intertemporal maximization problem. Prices for enforcement are
still quoted in terms of the consumption good, but transformed into a net present value by























t−1) ∈ [0,1] for all t,ω
t−1.
This leads us to a deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept developed by Kehoe and Levine
(1993).












0 = d0 for all i ∈ I, (43)
is given by stochastic processes for consumption and individual demands for enforcement
{ci,di}i∈I, a stochastic process of punishments d, a pricing functional p0 and stochastic
processes of agent-speciﬁc prices {pe
i}i∈I such that
1. {ci,di} solve problem (38) - (40) taking p0 and pe
i as given
2. d solves problem (38) taking p0 and pe
i as given
3. markets clear, i.e. equations (19) and (21) hold.
23By using a variational argument, from the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions of the con-
sumer’s problem one can easily verify that for any Kehoe-Levine equilibrium the pricing











where ˆ ci is consumption of agent i in equilibrium. The prices q0(ωt,s) are the Arrow-
Debreu prices implied by the pricing functional p0. Whenever interest rates are high, the
pricing functional p0 is ﬁnitely valued and, therefore, the problems of the agents and the
intermediary are always well deﬁned in this case.
Similarly, given the pricing functional fulﬁlls condition (44), one can verify through a













This allows us to prove the equivalence of Kehoe-Levine equilibria and Lindahl-equilibria
provided interest rates are high and the consumption process in Lindahl-equilibrium is
strictly bounded away from zero for every agent. As mentioned earlier, since optimal
allocation are always diﬀerent from autarky, it follows that interest rates are high given
any optimal allocation. From this follows immediately a version of the First Welfare The-
orem since preferences are monotone and given the form of the participation constraints
(40) we have a standard, convex Arrow-Debreu economy.
The intuition for this result is simple. From equation (40) it is clear that the equilib-
rium pricing functional is equivalent to the price process for state-contingent claims in a
Lindahl-equilibrium. The crucial step then involves expressing the schedule of borrowing
limits as participation constraints and verifying that the enforcement choice di is still
optimal given the optimal agent-speciﬁc price ˜ pe
i for the agents when facing participation
24constraints rather than borrowing limits. This is, however, ensured by the strong require-
ment that borrowing constraints are not too tight for every value of di. The borrowing
constraints reﬂect, then, exactly the participation constraints (40).
Theorem 4.2. Let ({ci,di,ai}i∈I,q,{pe
i}i∈I) be a Lindahl-equilibrium for which the sched-
ule of borrowing limits are not too tight. Suppose that interest rates are high in equilib-
rium. Then, ({ci,di}i∈I,d,{˜ pe
i}i∈I,p0) is a Kehoe-Levine equilibrium for initial conditions
(d0,{ai
0,pe
i,0}i∈I) where p0 is given by (44) and ˜ pe
i by equation (45).
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 4.3. Any Lindahl-equilibrium for with the borrowing constraints are not too
tight and interest rates are high is constrained eﬃcient.
5 Asset Pricing Implications
We already pointed out that borrowing costs can be decomposed into two components:
a claim-speciﬁc price that reﬂects the scarcity of funds and an additional premium that
reﬂects costs associated with default. People that are unconstrained in state s trade
state-contingent claims at the price q(ωt−1,s).
Constrained people, however, have to pay a higher price for the same claim. If agent
i is constrained in state s, he still pays q(ωt−1,s) for buying a(ωt−1,s) state-contingent
claims, but obtains a pay-oﬀ of only a(·) − pe
i(ωt−1)di(a(·)), where di(a) > 0 expresses
the amount of borrowing rights agent i has to buy at price pe
i > 0 to carry out this trade.




















25where a is a portfolio of state-contingent claims that pays a in every state s after history
ωt−1. Hence, for a < 0 we have 1 P
s ˆ qs < ˆ Ri(a) or, equivalently, there is a positive spread
between borrowing and lending in equilibrium for agents that are constrained.14
We analyze now how interest rates in Lindahl-equilibrium compare to the ones with
ﬁrst-best risk sharing in a standard Arrow-Debreu economy. There are two eﬀects on
interest rates. First, enforcement is costly and - as shown in Koeppl (2002) - varies
over time in an optimal allocation. Hence, even though there is no aggregate risk in
the economy, total resources available for consumption in equilibrium change over time
as well. Whenever enforcement increases from one period to the next, people have an
incentive to intertemporally smooth consumption with the result that interest rates tend
to be lower.
Second, if a positive amount of resources is spent on the enforcement technology, people
share less risk in the optimal allocation than in the ﬁrst-best. With our decentralization
this implies as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) that people borrow less than in the
standard Arrow-Debreu economy. This is only compatible with equilibrium if interest
rates are relatively lower. These ﬁndings are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 5.1. Let ({ˆ ci}i∈I, ˆ d) be an optimal allocation. If ˆ d(ωt−1) ≤ ˆ d(ωt), then
q(ωt,s) ≥ βπs in the corresponding Lindahl-equilibrium. Otherwise,
P
s q(ωt,s) > β if
and only if there exists i ∈ I such that E [u0(ˆ ci(ωt,s))] > u0(ˆ ci(ωt)).
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows that the two eﬀects can inﬂuence interest rates in diﬀerent directions.
This is the case when third-party enforcement decreases over time. Whether the risk
sharing eﬀect or the resource eﬀect dominates depends on the comovement of d and
individual consumption. As long as there is one person for which consumption declines in
expected terms from one period to the next, interest rates are lower than in a comparable
14Interestingly, in case a constrained agent wants to save, the interest rate for saving in a risk-free
asset is strictly lower than the one for unconstrained agents.
26Arrow-Debreu economy. The costs of borrowing for individual consumers can of course
be considerably higher due to the additional fees charged for borrowing rights.
6 Discussion
The concept of Lindahl-equilibrium is based on several implicit assumptions. The most
crucial one is the existence of agent-speciﬁc markets for the public good which seems
to be in contradiction to price-taking behavior by agents. However, one can reinterpret
having I agents as rather having I diﬀerent types of agents each being a continuum with
measure one.
More importantly is the criticism that the existence of agent-speciﬁc markets requires
the exclusivity of trades in the public good. Agents are not allowed to trade on markets
that are set up speciﬁcally for another agent. This requires not only information15
about which agents trade on which markets, but also preventing agents from acquiring
the public good on the wrong market or, equivalently, for the wrong price. Hence, an
enforcement problem diﬀerent from the one studied here seems to become important.
Since we assume public information about the identity of the agents, it is reasonable to
argue that the punishment technology is also used to punish agents that pay a diﬀerent
than their agent-speciﬁc price for the public good. Such free-riding after a particular
history of shocks would be punished with autarky forever plus the current utility penalty.
In fact, by condition (22), the extreme case of not paying the fee at all is ruled out in
equilibrium.
15The concept of Lindahl-equilibrium has recently been applied to the literature on asymmetric in-
formation. In particular, Bisin and Gottardi (2000) have used the concept to internalize externalities
inherent in adverse selection economies. Their approach naturally relies on extending the market struc-
ture to internalize all external eﬀects. Most interestingly, however, in their approach agents have the
choice to declare their type. Trades are required to be incentive compatible, so that agents will re-
veal their type truthfully. One could envision employing their approach here to analyze problems of
information revelation between the intermediary and the agents.
27A related issue concerns the production side of the equilibrium concept. There is a single
ﬁrm or intermediary that produces the public good taking prices on the markets for each
agent as given. Given convex costs and a linear technology to produce punishment, this
ﬁrm makes strictly positive proﬁts whenever these prices are positive. Hence, interpret-
ing the ﬁrm as privately owned there should be entry until zero proﬁts are made. This
criticism can be addressed by arguing that entry is prohibited and the ﬁrm is regulated
to behave as a price taker producing the public good in a proﬁt maximizing way. This
implies that there must be a public authority or government - not modelled here - that
implements agent-speciﬁc prices on the consumption side, while giving the ﬁrm the right
incentives to produce the right quantity of the public good. We do not regard our mod-
elling choice here as an accurate description of how public goods are generally provided
for. Our analysis simply shows that it is suﬃcient to have a competitive intermediary
operate the technology for decentralizing optimal allocations.
Another comment concerns the ability of the intermediary to commit for one period. In
light of this assumption the enforcement problem seems not to be solved, but merely
shifted from the consumption to the production side. The problem here is not so much
default by the intermediary in the sense that he does not operate the technology once he
has received the payments from the agents; the payments and operating the technology
could be reinterpreted as direct exchanges or spot transactions after the shocks have
occurred with the punishment technology being set for next period. The real issue is
whether there is an incentive for some of the agents and the intermediary to jointly
revise the original decision concerning the punishment technology. This can be seen as
renegotiation - or even as an intermediary inﬂuenced by partial interests. One possible
way to address this issue is to model the ownership structure of the intermediary via
shares traded among agents on the asset market. Given the possibility of default by
agents, markets are incomplete. Hence, there will be a conﬂict between owners about
the optimal plan of the ﬁrm which implies that the proper objective of such a privately
owned ﬁrm might not be clear altogether. It would then be intriguing to analyze whether
a particular ownership structure of the intermediary could actually solve the commitment
28problem associated with operating the punishment technology.
A short-coming of the Lindahl-equilibrium concept remains that the schedule of bor-
rowing constraints is not a choice variable for the enforcement intermediary. It is left
unanswered by our work how the schedules of borrowing constraints are set and who sets
them, since the only requirement we impose is that they preclude default in equilibrium
(cf. Assumption 3.1). Even though our concept is then well short of a theory of how
borrowing constraints are set on competitive asset markets, it potentially oﬀers a way to
endogenize the structure of these markets.
Suppose intermediaries compete by operating the punishment technology and by oﬀer-
ing schedules of borrowing constraints. Agents choose a borrowing constraint from a
schedule thereby self-selecting how much they want to borrow and at which cost. Costs
for borrowing are diﬀerent across agents, since they pay fees to relax their borrowing
constraints which are additional costs of borrowing besides interest payments. Together
with the price of a state-contingent claim - or the interest charged - they are the total
cost of going short in this claim. Whereas the price for the claim is linear, these fees are
not. Hence, borrowing takes place at non-linear prices; moreover, while prices are the
same for all agents when borrowing a certain amount, the total cost is diﬀerent across
agents.
This approach has the potential to gain insights in the equilibrium structure of inter-
est rates for diﬀerent levels of borrowing as well as demand and supply structures for
intertemporal borrowing. These insights will be important to shape future work that
addresses organization of ﬁnancial markets. In this respect the contribution of this chap-
ter must be strictly seen as a mere starting point towards a full ﬂedged theory of truly
endogenous borrowing constraints.
297 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.4:
Proof. The proof is identical to Alvarez and Jermann (2000), but is given for complete-


















but condition (29) does not hold. Then there exists some i ∈ I with a strictly higher
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution than j. Since for agent j the ex post incentive
compatibility constraint is not binding for (ωt,s), we can decrease cj(ωt,s) and increase
cj(ωt) slightly so as to keep her overall continuation utility after history ωt constant.
If we decrease ci(ωt) and increase ci(ωt,s) by the corresponding amounts, we increase
agent i’s overall expected utility given ωt since his marginal rate of substitution is strictly
higher than j’s. Since this does not violate the ex-post incentive feasibility constraints
for ωt nor (ωt,s), the allocation can not be optimal. A contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.5:











Using the fact that u0(ci(ωt,s)) > 0, it follows that pe
i(ωt) = 0 for all s.
Proof of Theorem 3.7:
Proof. The proof is by construction. Let ({ˆ ci}i∈I, ˆ d) be an optimal allocation. De-
ﬁne the security price process ˆ q by equation (33) and deﬁne further ˆ Qt(ωt+τ|ωt) =
30ˆ q(ωt,s) · ... · ˆ q(ωt+τ−1,s) for τ > 0. Next, given the optimal allocation and asset
prices ˆ q we use equation (35) to deﬁne agent-speciﬁc prices ˆ pe
i.
Claim: For the process of asset prices ˆ q and agent-speciﬁc prices {ˆ pe
i}i∈I, the solution to
the problem of the enforcement intermediary is ˆ d(ωt) for all ωt.
There exists some j ∈ I for whom constraint (4) does not bind for the optimal allocation.
Then, from the ﬁrst-order necessary condition (8) at ωt and (ωt,s) for agent j and the








Hence, for any agent i we again obtain from the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of opti-

































































which shows that condition (11) holds. Hence, given agent-speciﬁc prices ˆ pe
i(ωt) the in-
termediary produces ˆ d(ωt).
31To prove that the optimal allocation is a solution to the agent’s problem, let the process
of asset holdings of agent i be given by the diﬀerence of the present value of consumption
net of endowment including proﬁts and net of fees for enforcement, i.e.,
ˆ a
i(ω





































for all t > 0 and ωt ∈ Ωt.
For now we deﬁne the schedules of borrowing constraints as linear decreasing functions











Deﬁne the intercept of these functions as follows:





t,s)) = ˆ a
i(ω
































Similarly, it is straightforward to deﬁne initial borrowing schedules, asset portfolios and
agent-speciﬁc fees such that the restrictions on the initial conditions of Deﬁnition 3.2 are
fulﬁlled and ˆ d0 satisﬁes equation (16).
32Claim: The processes for consumption, asset holdings and borrowing rights (ˆ ci,ˆ ai, ˆ di),
where ˆ di = ˆ d, are a solution to agent i’s problem given the security price process ˆ q and
the process of agent-speciﬁc fees ˆ pe
i.
First note that by construction the borrowing constraints are binding for agents with
binding ex post incentive compatibility constraints. Also, since ˆ ci(ωt) > 0 for all ωt for
any optimal allocation, the borrowing constraints are otherwise not binding. Also, given
the deﬁnition of asset holdings, asset prices and agent-speciﬁc prices, for every agent i
(ˆ ci,ˆ ai, ˆ di) is feasible.
Next, by Lemma 3.4 and the deﬁnition of ˆ q, the intertemporal Euler equation given by





with strict inequality for agents where the ex post incentive compatibility constraint is
binding in state (ωt,s).
Next, by the deﬁnition of ˆ pe
i and the construction of the schedules of borrowing con-
straints, ˆ di = ˆ d satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order necessary condition (26) for every agent i that
is borrowing constrained for some state. Also note that unconstrained agents have
ˆ pe
i(ωt) = 0 and, hence, are indiﬀerent between any choice of di. We assume that their
demand is given by ˆ di = ˆ d.
Since the intertemporal Euler equation together with the transversality condition (28) is
suﬃcient for optimality, we are left to check the latter one. If the borrowing constraint
is binding for agent i after some history of shocks, ˆ wi(ωt) − Bi(ˆ di(ωt−1),ωt) = 0.
Otherwise, by iterating forward and using the deﬁnition of Bi(ˆ di(ωt−1),ωt), we have that
ˆ w
i(ω































































































which follows from iterating on the Euler equation, and, ﬁnally, the assumption that







































and the transversality condition is fulﬁlled.
Since markets clear by construction, we are to satisfy the last condition in Deﬁnition
3.2 that the borrowing constraints are not too tight. We construct ﬁrst the functions
{J0
t }∞
t=0 given security price process ˆ q, agent-speciﬁc prices ˆ pe
i and the functions for
Bi(di(ωt),(ωt,s)) we deﬁned earlier. We then adjust the schedules of borrowing con-
straints and iterate until convergence to condition (22). We distinguish here the two
34cases of binding and non-binding borrowing constraints.
Whenever the ex post incentive compatibility constraint for agent i is binding in state
















Since Bi(ˆ di(ωt),(ωt,s)) is linear and strictly decreasing in di(ωt), J0
t+1 is also a strictly
decreasing and strictly concave function of di(ωt) with Bi(ˆ di(ωt),(ωt,s) being the tangent







This allows us to construct J0
t+1 for all wealth levels greater than Bi(¯ di(ωt),(ωt,s)). For
wealth levels corresponding to di(ωt) > ¯ di(ωt) the function J0
t+1(Bi(di(ωt),(ωt,s))) is not
deﬁned.
Note that, by the previous claim, (ˆ ci,ˆ ai, ˆ di) are solutions to agent i’s problem and, hence,
are solutions for {J0
t }∞
t=0 given initial asset holdings ai
0 and the choice of di(ωt) being
restricted to the interval [0, ¯ di].














for all di ∈ [0, ¯ di]. Clearly, B1
i (·) is a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function on
[0, ¯ di] being tangent to J0




















35since ˆ di(ωt) < 1 for all ωt and borrowing up to the net present value of future endowment
net of taxes implies that future consumption will be equal to 0. We can then construct
the function J0
t+1 for wealth levels greater than Bi(ˆ di(ωt,s),(ωt,s))). Next, we deﬁne
new schedules of borrowing constraints and new cut-oﬀ levels ¯ di as for the other case.
Since ˆ wi(ωt,s) ≥ B1
i ((ˆ di(ωt,s),(ωt,s)), (ˆ ci,ˆ ai, ˆ di) are still feasible given the initial asset
holdings and, hence, optimal. We can then construct new functions {J1
t }∞
t=0 for the price
process ˆ q and ˆ pe
i, the new process of borrowing constraints B1
i (·) and the new cut-oﬀ
values for ¯ di
1. Iterating until convergence yields borrowing schedule ˆ Bi(·) and a cut-oﬀ









for all di ∈ [0,1]. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
Proof. Let {ˆ ci, ˆ di}i∈I be a Lindahl-equilibrium. Hence, ˆ di = ˆ d for all i. Then, given
the borrowing constraints are not too tight, the allocation satisﬁes the participation
constraints (40). Next, deﬁne the pricing functional p0 by equation (44) and agent-
speciﬁc prices for every agent i by equation (45).
Given {˜ pe
i}i∈I, we ﬁrst show that ˆ d solves the intermediary’s problem. From the deﬁ-
nition of the implied Arrow-Debreu prices q0(ωt,s) and the fact that the participation
constraints are binding if and only if the corresponding borrowing constraints are bind-
ing, it follows that ˜ pe
i(ωt) = ˆ pe
i for all i ∈ I and ωt. Since the ﬁrst-order necessary
conditions for the intermediary’s problem are identical to equation (11), ˆ d maximizes
proﬁts.























































where ηi is the process of Lagrange multipliers on the participation constraints of agent




















with ηi(ω0) ≡ 0. Thus, by construction for any given process ci, the Lagrange multipliers
minimize the function L.
We then verify that - given a choice for ci - the deﬁnition of agent speciﬁc prices ˜ pe
i fulﬁlls
the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of L with respect to di. The ﬁrst-order necessary



























































Using the last two expression in the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for di(ωt) conﬁrms
that the deﬁnition of ˜ pe
i is consistent with the deﬁnition of the Lagrange multipliers.
















































































and all other terms of the Lagrangian L are ﬁnite which allows us to exchange the order
of summation in the deﬁnition of the Lagrangian L.
This allows us to prove that (ˆ ci, ˆ di) are optimal given the deﬁnitions of prices and mul-
tipliers. Dropping constant terms from the Lagrangian, using the deﬁnition of p0 and ˜ pe
i



























































































































































Finally, using the fact that u0(ˆ ci(ωt)) ≥
u(ci(ωt))−u(ˆ ci(ωt))
ci(ωt)−ˆ ci(ωt) , which follows from the concavity























































































Proof of Proposition 5.1:
39Proof. Suppose ˆ d(ωt−1) ≤ ˆ d(ωt). Then, from resource feasibility it follows for all s ∈ S
that
P
i∈I ˆ ci(ωt) ≥
P
i∈I ˆ ci(ωt,s). Hence, for all s ∈ S, there exists j ∈ I with
u0(ˆ cj(ωt,s))
u0(ˆ cj(ωt)) ≥






The second part of the proof follows directly from summing equation (33) over s ∈ S.
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